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Introduction   
In March 2011, a popular uprising in Syria – following the lead of 
the revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya and Bahrain – chal-
lenged the stability of the apparently unshakable Assad regime that 
had ruled Syria for the previous four decades. During that time, the 
absolute power of the security services, the high echelons of the Ar-
my and the core of the regime had only been challenged once. That 
was during the so-called Muslim Brotherhood uprising between 1976 
and 1982, the study of which is beyond the scope of this writing, but 
which resulted in the ousting of the Brotherhood in Syria and the 
near elimination of their political and social role in the country.  
However, the beginning of the revolution in Syria in 2011 brought 
the Brotherhood back to the political scene, where they have played a 
very important role, various aspects of which are examined in this 
paper, which deals with the period from 2011 to mid-2013 although a 
short historical introduction to the past decade is provided for con-
textualisation purposes. Building on the analysis of this short period, 
it is the aim of this study to describe the strategy used by the Muslim 
Brotherhood to become a prominent political actor and the repre-
sentative of the mainstream Islamic current in Syria, as well as stat-
ing their degree of success in achieving that.  
Due to the immediacy of the data and the ongoing changes to the po-
litical and strategic equation, this study is mostly based on primary 
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sources such as interviews and direct testimonies as well as press 
releases and articles in the Brotherhood’s main official mouthpiece. 
 
Background: Overview of the Brotherhood’s Political Strategy 
During Bashar al-Assad’s Era 
Formally opposed to the Syrian regime, when Bashar al-Assad came 
to power in 2000 the Muslim Brotherhood expressed their hope that 
the new leadership would bring change to Syria and that a political 
opening would take place1. Following that premise, in 2001, they 
presented the National Honor Pact, a gentlemen’s code of conduct 
where they suggested that all political forces unite without excluding 
anyone2. No answer worth mentioning was received from other op-
posing entities or figures, who were conducting their own activities 
of civil society development, taking advantage of a short-lived politi-
cal opening sponsored by Bashar al-Assad during his first year of 
rule known as the Damascus Spring, one that quickly turned into 
winter when the regime perceived the threat it posed to its stability3.   
In a particularly difficult year for the Syrian regime, when its Army 
was forced to withdraw from Lebanon as a result of the Cedar Revo-
lution against its presence in the country (2005), an amalgam of both 
the opposition inside and outside the country united under the banner 
of the Damascus Declaration4. They demanded a change in the re-
gime and a transition to democracy, as well as, for the first time, the 
granting of rights to Kurdish individuals deprived of their citizenship 
since 1962. They made sure to emphasise the national character of 
this coalition so as not to give the chance to the regime to accuse 
them of being part of the international conspiracy initiated by the US 
invasion of Iraq and followed by the accusations of the Syrian re-
gime’s involvement in the Lebanese ex-Prime Minister Rafik 
Hariri’s assassination in 2004. However, the margin of action was 
limited and the scope of influence on society, due to the overwhelm-
ingly intellectual orientation of their premises, remained almost non-
existent. 
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Surprisingly, in a move that has been widely criticized and only par-
tially explained, less than one year later, the Muslim Brotherhood 
joined the National Salvation Front in March 2006 established by the 
man who had long served as the Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs 
and Vice President but who had turned against the regime in 2005 as 
a result of a factional struggle with the Assad clan: Abd al-Halim 
Khaddam. As a result of the materialisation of this marriage of con-
venience, the Brotherhood’s membership in the Damascus Declara-
tion was frozen, while the honeymoon with Khaddam lasted until 
2009, when after the Israeli Cast Lead operation against the Gaza 
Strip, the Brotherhood announced that they would keep their opposi-
tion activities on hold in recognition for the regime’s support for the 
Palestinians5. 
Eventually, when the uprising of 2011 began, the Muslim Brother-
hood took on a series of activities (that will be addressed in this pa-
per) and formally announced on May 2011 the resumption of their 
opposition against the regime6, in an attempt to pave the way for a 
future accession to power in the event of a regime collapse or 
change.  
 
1. The Muslim Brotherhood’s role in the Syrian revolution 
1.1. The calls for demonstrations 
The Egyptian revolution proved to be an important model for the 
Syrians to follow and some of those who believed something similar 
could also happen in their country set up a Facebook page calling for 
a Syrian “Day of Rage” on February 15, 20117, but to no avail. In 
spite of this initial reticence, only a few days later, on February 17, 
2011, a spontaneous episode in the Hariqa souk in Damascus ended 
up with dozens of people shouting at a policeman: “The Syrian peo-
ple will not be humiliated” (as-shaab as-suri ma biyenzall)8. It was a 
popular explosion of “rage” nobody could claim to have orchestrated. 
Another Facebook page, created on January 18, 2011, surfaced under 
the name of The Syrian Revolution Against Bashar al-Assad9. Initial-
ly, and following the regime’s discourse which blamed the Muslim 
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Brotherhood for stirring the uprising and leading the demonstrations, 
media close to the Syrian government reported that those running the 
above mentioned page calling for demonstrations on March 15, 2011 
were members of the Muslim Brotherhood10.  Although it proved to 
be true as we will see, people responded to those claims emphasising 
their independence from all factions and shouting “(We are) Not 
Brothers and not Salafis, we just want freedom”.  
However, while no single political faction can claim to have spon-
sored or ignited the revolution, it is interesting to note that the Mus-
lim Brotherhood, after the events in Tunisia and Egypt, worked out a 
plan to deal with the possibility of a revolution taking place in Syria, 
as Molhem al-Droubi, one of its prominent members, stated: 
 “The Brotherhood took part in the revolution before its beginning, 
as the revolution is the reaction to the various expressions of injus-
tice accumulated during the past four decades […]. There was a 
meeting of the leadership in January 2011 to study the Tunisian and 
Egyptian revolutions and I was appointed to draw a plan for what 
could happen in our country. I presented a plan called ‘Leave, Ba-
shar’ (Erhal Bashar) where I summarised what we had to do in case 
a revolution started in Syria […] and among the most prominent 
points we agreed on was that we would not have any specific de-
mands, but that our demands would correspond to those of the peo-
ple. We also set four strategic frameworks for the revolution at the 
time: the peaceful character of the revolution, its national character, 
the preservation of the unity of the territory and the refusal of any 
foreign (meaning non-Arab and non-Muslim) military interven-
tion”11.  
As it has been mentioned above, it was also before the revolution that 
the Syrian Revolution Against Bashar al-Assad page was created by 
a group of Syrians among whom were Fida’ al-Sayyid, member of 
the Brotherhood born in Sweden and one of the founders of the of-
fice of the Damascus Declaration in that country, and Hamza al-
Abdallah, whose membership can be presumed, although he only 
defines himself as a Syrian activist and film-maker, besides being a 
member of the Nahda Project, which aims at developing the capaci-
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ties and skills of Arab citizens12. It is interesting to note how after the 
controversy regarding whether the Brotherhood were behind it or not, 
in 2013 they showed no reticence in admitting it publicly and even 
attributing the sparking of the revolution to themselves:  
“The Syrian street had reached a situation where it was about to ex-
plode like a volcano and was waiting for someone to shout first and 
knock on the door first, […] and from that need the initiative of the 
Syrian Revolution Against Bashar al-Assad page was born; an initia-
tive that, thank God, sparked a revolution all over the country”13.  
Moreover, Hamza al-Abdallah added that: 
 “Regarding the people’s response to the calls for demonstrations, it 
is important to note that the Syrian Revolution Against Bashar al-
Assad page was not the first that appeared in this context, but before 
it many others came that paved the way, and when we called for 
demonstrations on the 4th and the 5th of February (2011), they were 
not successful and so, we set the new date for mid-March. Among 
those pages we can find ‘For a Popular Movement Towards a Syrian 
Day of Rage’ and the ‘Syrian Day of Rage’”.  
This means that the previous calls for demonstrations had also been 
organised by individuals belonging to the Brotherhood. But whether 
activists on the ground knew this or not, nobody seemed to have any 
reservations regarding the people behind the Facebook activities until 
the names proposed for each Friday became gradually more reli-
giously oriented and more divisive. Although the context of radicali-
sation, mainly along sectarian cleavages had been developing since 
the destruction of much of “Sunni” Homs (while leaving “Alawi” 
Homs largely intact) by the Syrian Army in February 2012, and the 
sectarian policies that followed, the controversy regarding the Face-
book page reached its peak with the clear sectarian cut reflected in 
the name Friday for the Protection of the (Sunni) Majority chosen for 
April 26, 201314. Criticism against the Syrian Revolution page esca-
lated as it seemed to give arguments to extremist Salafi and Jihadi 
currents to develop their sectarian discourse, already exacerbated by 
the regime’s sectarian massacres like the one in Baniyas in May 2013 
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among many others. Therefore, this situation clearly threatened any 
future coexistence in the country. Many alternative pages appeared as 
a counterbalance15, but it remained the dominant one and where most 
people still voted for the names of each Friday. The fact that this 
page never tried to address a more moderate audience, maybe for fear 
of being overshadowed by Salafis16, might play against the Brother-
hood in the future if it has not already done so. 
1.2. The political front 
Since the beginning of the revolution, it was clear that there was no 
effective leadership due to its loose popular nature. Despite their set-
ting up the Syrian Revolution page, the leaders of the Muslim Broth-
erhood declared that “starting the revolution is an honor we cannot 
attribute to ourselves”17. But as many political analysts have pointed 
out, a revolution needs a leadership that can guide it through so diffi-
cult a process and achieve part of its political demands. With that 
purpose in mind, and maybe following the Libyan example, especial-
ly when both the Libyan and the Syrian regimes responded with live 
ammunition against peaceful protesters (setting aside the differences 
between both), the Muslim Brotherhood, once again, and according 
to many because they were the only group considered to be organ-
ised18, took the initiative and organised a conference in Antalya in 
May 2011. Only a few days later, another conference took place in 
Brussels, under the individual auspices of the former leader of the 
Brotherhood, Ali Sadr al-Din al-Bayanouni, hinting at the fact that 
the regional division between Aleppo (former leadership) and Hama 
(current leadership, until november 2014), which had led to a split in 
the organisation in the past, was still present. 
Finally, it was in the National Salvation Conference of July 16, 2011 
in Istanbul, when the Muslim Brotherhood defined the lines of its 
strategy and its view for the future Syria. In his speech, Bayanouni, 
while emphasising the national character of the revolution, insisted 
on the Arab and Muslim character of Syria. Whether it was due to 
this or to any other reason, the fact remains that many of the Kurdish 
representatives decided to leave the conference. As if it had been a 
premonition, since the end of 2012, a clear division appeared be-
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tween the Islamists operating on the ground and the Kurdish brigades 
after the attempt by the Free Syrian Army (FSA) to take control of 
the city of Ra’s al-Ayn in Al-Hassake province. Add to that the fact 
that in July 2012 many Kurdish political factions had already formed 
their own coalitions separated from the main Syrian opposition bod-
ies.  
Maybe in an attempt to appease the general mood, although they had 
already published in 2005 a document with their view regarding the 
Kurdish issue19, on October 7, 2012, Muhammad Riad Shaqfa, the  
leader of the Brotherhood at the time, but who has remained more in 
the shadows than others like Ali al-Bayanouni or Faruq Tayfur (ex-
deputy of Shaqfa), presented his condolences on the anniversary of 
the murder of the Kurdish leader Mishal Tammo20 insisting that the 
Muslim Brotherhood would continue its efforts in order to build a 
homeland for all “without exclusion or marginalisation”. Only a few 
days later, Shaqfa visited the leadership of the Iraqi Kurdistan alt-
hough nothing about the meeting transcended besides the fact that 
they had spoken about “mutual interests” in Syria.  
Going back to the meetings of the opposition, those conferences rep-
resented the first steps towards the creation in October 2011 of what 
came to be known as the Syrian National Council (SNC), a loose 
body of approximately 94 political representatives which in the be-
ginning did not include members of the “revolutionary movement” 
(hirak thawri)21 but which later widened its scope to around 300 
members. 
Since then, and because of the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood or-
ganised most of these conferences22, rumors and more direct accusa-
tions have been cast against the Muslim Brotherhood as to their 
having a far wider influence on the SNC than what corresponds to 
their real weight in the revolution, through their membership and that 
of their allies (some of them representing the “revolutionary move-
ment”) in the opposition bodies. This was confirmed, but nuanced, 
by a person close to the SNC23: “In the SNC the Muslim Brotherhood 
are more numerous (than other Islamist trends) and they are one of 
two main blocks […]. The Islamists (all trends) form about half the 
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opposition, and we could say that all the rest are their allies. They do 
not want any problems with the Islamists now, it is not their priori-
ty”. By being allies he meant that, despite their differences, there is a 
common denominator joining the SNC: the “no to dialogue”. This 
explains why many members of the SNC harshly criticised the for-
mation of the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Oppo-
sition Forces in November 2012 which they feared would be forced 
into a dialogue with the regime. 
In this context, the Muslim Brotherhood had a “very violent reac-
tion” to the formation of the National Coalition (NC) because “they 
believed that this would play against all their previous work, the ne-
gotiations they had conducted and the alliances they had made”, in-
cluding the resumption of their previous alliance (in the eighties) 
with Riad al-Turk’s communists. “They were afraid of the Dama-
scene elements’ irruption (mainly religious figures from the city like 
Moaz al-Khatib –who became the President of the NC, with no ties 
with the Brotherhood24 and with a better understanding of the inter-
nal dynamics in the country), as they had been totally neglected in 
the SNC, especially when there was a sour sense among the revolu-
tionaries that Aleppo, through the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood 
and others, had all the control, despite its late incorporation into the 
movement”25. 
Eventually, as the so-called Friends of Syria dug their heels in the 
necessity of forming the NC, “two actors influenced the position 
adopted by the Muslim Brotherhood on the issue: the AKP in Tur-
key, and Muhammad Badia (General Leader of the International 
Muslim Brotherhood Organisation) through Muhammad Mursi26”. 
And “that is where the Aleppo-Hama division came once again to the 
forefront”, as those in Hama were very reluctant to the idea of losing 
their predominance in the SNC, while the Aleppo faction was more 
willing to accept compromises for the sake of support and listened to 
their counterparts in those two countries. “I thought the Muslim 
Brotherhood was more organised than it is and it seems they are real-
ly affected by their internal disputes”27. 
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In any case, however divided they are, they have been able to prove 
their hegemony (in alliance with other Islamists) over the SNC as it 
became obvious during the elections held in Doha in November 
2012, where a very complex system of voting based on lists and not 
individuals was set up and by which “they were able to push all their 
candidates forward by presenting various lists, all of them having one 
of their candidates in the first place”. Nevertheless, “truth be told, 
despite everything that we hear about the Muslim Brotherhood and 
episodes like the one of the elections, they are patriotic and don’t 
just work for themselves: they care for Syria and they work for it not 
to become a toy in the hands of the international community, and that 
is precisely the spirit of the SNC”28. 
 
1.3. The external alliances 
In relation to what has just been said, being patriotic or not (that is, 
being a traitor: kha’in) has become a description used by the opposi-
tion itself especially after calls for an international intervention mul-
tiplied (among the first advocates of such demands was Haytham al-
Maleh, ascribed to the Muslim Brotherhood because he worked as 
their lawyer in the eighties but who developed his own line of work 
after feeling he had been sidelined within the SNC). The deep divide 
between the “internal” political opposition, mainly composed of sec-
ularists who formally reject any kind of international involvement, 
something which today is totally unavoidable, and the “external op-
position”, where Islamists in their variety play the leading role or 
hold a dominant position, and which from the beginning cast its bet 
on external support (mainly Western) has become an insurmountable 
bump in the efforts to unite the opposition. This, and especially the 
fact that countries in the Gulf such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar have 
led the effective support, has brought a lot of takhween (tag someone 
as a traitor) to the forefront: the Muslim Brotherhood has not been 
spared its own share.  
In this context, the frequently highlighted relationship between the 
Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and Turkey has been underemphasised 
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by the leaders of the organisation29 and according to their former of-
ficial spokesman Zuhair Salim, the reason why they usually organise 
their events in Turkey is because Syrians do not require a visa to en-
ter the country30. Leaving that as an anecdote, it is interesting to note 
that the Hama wing of the Brotherhood, led by Shaqfa and Tayfur, 
which has always been more radical in its postulates, appears to be 
closer to the Turkish leadership, which they consider a model for the 
future Syrian state31 and whose military intervention Shaqfa32 ap-
peared to be ready to accept, while the Aleppo faction seemed more 
keen on an Arab intervention33. In any case, their taking advantage of 
their special relationship with the AKP, the fact that they now all re-
side in Turkey and that it is there that they develop most of their ac-
tivities cannot be denied. 
However, it is the so-called Qatari-Brotherhood bond that raised the 
diplomatic alarm in March 2013. The election of Ghassan Hitto –
later followed by Ahmad Tu’mah- as president for the future Transi-
tional Government and the ensuing resignation as President of the 
NC by Ahmad Moaz al-Khatib, who had occupied that position since 
November 2012 after his exile from Syria where he used to work as a 
religious preacher and scholar, was interpreted as the imposition of 
Qatar’s will being contested by Al-Khatib. However, Ghassan Hitto 
is not a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, and he was not even the 
initial candidate of the Brotherhood for the elections34. There was 
more to it that exceeds the scope of this writing, but which puts a 
question mark on Qatar’s real power on the NC, which was then the 
main body of the opposition35.  
It is true, nevertheless, that the Muslim Brotherhood and Qatar have 
developed some kind of alliance as a few members of the SNC 
acknowledge36, and that it is based on the historical enmity between 
Saudi Arabia and its small neighbor and the Saudi relationship with 
the Brotherhood, which we will summarize for the sake of simplicity 
and due to space restrictions. Throughout the past decades the Mus-
lim Brotherhood (especially the Egyptian branch) and the Wahhabite 
power in Saudi Arabia had developed a symbiotic relationship. Dur-
ing the 1920s and the 1930s, "the Wahhabites and the Muslim Broth-
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erhood shared a unified objective to combat materialism and immo-
rality", but “the Muslim Brotherhood (who diverged with the Wah-
habites on the issue of legitimate authority) made a more 
instrumental use of Saudi political authority, as they were very happy 
to find shelter in Saudi Arabia where they could escape from the per-
secution of nationalist regimes”37. In the 1950s, the Saudi monarchs, 
opposed to nationalist regimes, were the natural allies of the perse-
cuted Brotherhood, and the latter held important positions in the field 
of education in the Kingdom. However, when the Saudi regime ac-
cepted the American protection in exchange for setting up military 
bases in its territory, it became clear that “the order of priorities was 
not the same for the Muslim Brotherhood as for the Wahhabi 
sheikhs”38. Moreover, since the Brotherhood had been expanding its 
ideology, which questioned some precepts of the Kingdom such as 
hereditary monarchy, it had become a threat to Wahhabi ideology. 
The former supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Saudi regime, 
became its most bitter foe (although a few leaders of the Syrian Mus-
lim Brotherhood in exile remained in its territory). It was at that point 
that Qatar tried to take the lead, becoming the main supporter for the 
different branches of the Brotherhood especially by means of its re-
cently created (at the time) TV channel Aljazeera which promoted a 
moderate view of Islam and which during the revolution has given 
the prominent role to Islamist spokespeople close to the Brother-
hood39.  However, in the case of Syria, although Qatar has always 
been fond of the Brotherhood’s ideology, the existence of a particular 
alliance with this country has been denied by the Hama wing of the 
organization40. 
Nevertheless, since the revolution started, the Syrian Muslim Broth-
erhood has tried in various communiqués to attract the attention and 
support of Saudi Arabia by praising the efforts made by the king to 
support the Syrian cause41, something that, for instance, they have 
not done with Qatar and Kuwait except for a few words by Faruq 
Tayfur42. Whatever their efforts, it remains clear that Saudi Arabia 
wants “anyone except the Muslim Brotherhood: they hate them”43. 
As a result, they “threw themselves into the arms of those willing to 
support them: the Qataris”44. In any case, due to the never-ending 
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rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, it seems that whatever dis-
pleases one pleases the other at least in this specific aspect. As such, 
it comes as no surprise that Qatar favours the Brotherhood, although 
its support is being gradually constrained. 
 
1.4. Political rivalries: 
The choice of Hitto provides some clues about the real power of the 
Muslim Brotherhood in the NC despite initial accusations of having 
forced Hitto on the Coalition. In June 2013, they only had seven 
formal members in the Coalition, and as a matter of fact, “the non-
Muslim Brotherhood (Islamist) faction in the NC is stronger than the 
Muslim Brotherhood block”45. Therefore, what needs to be acknowl-
edged in the struggle for power is that the strongest rivalries are not, 
as presumed, between secularists and Islamists in the political front, 
but among Islamists themselves because they are “competing for the 
same public, the same social base”, whereas secularists and Islamists 
cannot, by definition and in principle, share the same social bases.  
The Muslim Brotherhood, in this confrontation (which at times be-
comes a fluid alliance), has “followed the same line it set to itself 
since the beginning”46. However, there is a point that must be ad-
dressed regarding this affirmation. While the document they present-
ed describing their political view for Syria on March 25, 201247 made 
almost no references to religion and reaffirmed the Brotherhood’s 
will to set up a civil State omitting the famous expression “with an 
Islamic framework”, the one they presented only a few months later, 
(September 27, 2012) named The Syria That We Want – which had 
been first published as an appendix to their political project in 
200448, seemed to be a step back in their postulates: “We want Syria 
to be a country with an Arab and Islamic identity because Islam is a 
religion and a civilization for Muslim citizens and a civilizational 
identity for non-Muslims” or “We want it to be a country where eve-
ryone can be happy under the rule of God’s Law by satisfying every-
one and giving them the right to choose”. This might have come as a 
counterbalance to the escalation of radical discourses on the ground 
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with the increasing strength of Jabhat al-Nusra (the Islamic State of 
Iraq and Sham had not been established yet) and people’s relative 
dissatisfaction with them, as well as a means of distancing them-
selves from radical discourses -within the Islamist framework- espe-
cially when “people tend to distrust the Muslim Brotherhood”49. 
  
1.5.  Relief campaigns, religious schools and preaching (da’wa):  
As the revolution and the regime’s response provoked the displace-
ment of many Syrians due to the bombings of neighborhoods or cit-
ies, relief works started to proliferate in the area. According to 
Abdulrahman al-Haj:  
“When the protests turned into a real revolution, the Brotherhood 
started to expand the scope of its influence in Syria again by means 
of relief activities (they set up a specific organisation that started 
working immediately) […] (but) it was soon obvious that the division 
between Hama and Aleppo had an impact on the Brotherhood, in the 
sense that Aleppo and the Eastern areas of the country received less 
relief and logistical aid in comparison to Hama and Idleb […] 
(which led to) the formation of a new organisation made up of the 
Aleppo elements (the second generation of the eighties) and with the 
support of the Spiritual Fathers (Bayanouni and Zuhair Salim), the 
so-called National Action Group led by Ahmad Ramadan”50.  
The truth remains that although the Aleppo faction has more power 
now, it is the Hamawi group that has called the shots in the relief 
works since the beginning. “The Brotherhood was the only group 
who, despite their organisational leaks, had a budget before the revo-
lution of which they spent a lot in the first months”51. Thus, it comes 
as no surprise that Faruq Tayfur, ex vice General Controller of the 
Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (he resigned after accepting the post of 
vice President of the SNC and was succeeded by Ali Sadr al-Din al-
Bayanouni, former leader), is the president of the Syrian Association 
for Humanitarian Relief and Development (Istanbul, 2012), which 
according to its executive director was the only one recognised by 
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the SNC at the time52. “They insisted on supervising the humanitari-
an aid and relief activities. […] Every time I visit the hospital the 
SNC has in Tripoli (Lebanon), one of them has to come with me”53. 
Whatever their aims, many rumors were spread from the very early 
days of the revolution pointing to the Brotherhood giving out help in 
exchange of some kind of loyalty and refusing to give it to those who 
did not comply with it54. However, it is difficult to prove those accu-
sations. In any case, spreading their modeate religious ideology has 
been the main objective for the Brotherhood 
On a level related to the spread of ideology through education and 
health care, the second issue of the Brotherhood’s magazine dealt 
with children and their proneness to Post-Dramatic Trauma Syn-
drome (PDTS). In the list of steps to take in order to prevent it or 
treat it, it is very remarkable that the first thing they suggest to pro-
tect children from depression is: 
“… reinforcing their faith in God and their satisfaction with God and 
his designations, something which can be achieved by teaching the 
child the names of God and his characteristics and establishing a 
link between that and the child’s life and reality, because God will 
help us go through this […], making it a habit for him to read the 
Quran […] since reinforcing the child’s relationship with God will 
make him stronger, and making sure not to establish a relationship 
between negative things and the fact that God is their cause without 
explaining that God wants something good from that which will 
eventually become visible”. 
This comes before suggesting more professionally-oriented tasks 
such as “exercising his capacity of smiling and being optimistic”. It 
is evident that with these kinds of articles emphasising faithfulness in 
God, in an attempt to show themselves as the guarantors of a moder-
ate discourse, the mouthpiece of the Brotherhood is working on its 
social bases for the future, especially insisting on the defamation 
campaign being waged against them55. To achieve that aim, the mag-
azine is distributed inside Syria56 in different areas where the Broth-
erhood is working on rebuilding its networks, starting with family 
links57. In this respect, an ex-member of the SNC58 acknowledged 
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that while the rest of the opposition was scared of approaching Hatay 
near the Turkish border, the Muslim Brotherhood were already inside 
Syria, and in fact, a source close to the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood 
admitted that they were trying to build their own cadres inside the 
country by spreading the ideology of the organisation59. According to 
the same source, those people being trained to become members of 
the Brotherhood were paying small fees in exchange for their train-
ing. In this same line, Riad Shaqfa explained: “in the beginning we 
said that this was a time for revolution, not ideology, (but) now there 
are many groups inside so we feel we should reorganise”60. 
It is difficult to estimate how far-reaching their support is at a point 
when they have already formed their first political party although it 
has not been very much publicised61. What is true is that the most 
radical currents are still leading the way both in humanitarian aid 
provision in liberated areas and in the armed struggle. 
 
1.6. The Arms Factor 
In an interview with Al-Magharibiyya TV (14/03/2012), Zuhair Sal-
im insisted that “the only thing that we have asked for is the right to 
demonstrate peacefully”, and it is this peaceful character of the revo-
lution that the Brotherhood emphasised for months, highlighting the 
fact that people were forced to take up arms (although the first armed 
actions were carried out by the defected soldiers) in order to defend 
themselves from the attacks of the Syrian regime. Nevertheless, they 
have admitted to having their own brigades: “We cannot lead armed 
groups while the death penalty is applied on us just for being mem-
bers of the Brotherhood”62.  
“How on Earth can we have our own brigades after thirty years out-
side the country? […] The Muslim Brotherhood do not have their 
own brigades, but some brigades with an Islamist character contact-
ed us for coordination purposes when they were formed, and in this 
respect, we have no problem with speaking to everyone. If some of 
them are more prone to the Brotherhood it is because we have been 
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treated very unjustly during the past decades and that has provoked 
some empathy towards us”63, insisted Muhammad Riad Shaqfa.  
And he added that “with a view to uniting the brigades and their divi-
sions that trust the Brotherhood through a moderate line of thought, 
we invited them to Istanbul, where the Organisation of the Shields of 
the Revolution was created as an independent Islamist-prone organi-
sation close to us”64. However, despite such claims, according to a 
deep study by Aron Lund65,  
“the Tawhid Division has fought alongside Islamists from non-FSA 
factions such as Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham, and Fajr al-Islam. 
According to some sources, it is funded by exiled Islamists, including 
the Muslim Brotherhood. Unlike these groups, however, the Tawhid 
Division is not primarily a religious movement, and it is not fighting 
to bring about a religious state”.   
This, however, does not mean that they have their own brigades, but, 
as a well-known Lebanese journalist66 declared, emphasising the 
moving sands on which the armed opposition rests:  
“When the Tawhid Division was formed in the northern area of the 
Aleppo countryside and part of the city itself, the Brotherhood sup-
ported them […] but they do not follow the Brotherhood’s doctrine, 
and […] in fact, the Zanqi Brigade defected from the Division be-
cause they had financial problems and little ammunition […], so the 
Brotherhood came and agreed with the brigade that they would re-
ceive individual help […], but its men are not Brotherhood”. 
In any case, at least until the time of writing in mid-2013 (although 
the tendency has not changed much) it seemed that the Muslim 
Brotherhood was only supporting the less extremist brigades that call 
for a civil state because they are “a political party”67, not religious 
sheikhs. Following the logic of this statement in an informal speech 
with expert François Burgat in Beirut (March, 2013), he divided the 
armed opposition into various categories, among which he described 
the category “belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood” as being the 
one formed by those brigades “that raise the flag of the revolution, in 
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contrast to the Salafists and Jihadists, who do not, and instead prefer 
the black flag”. 
Leaving this aside, it is interesting to note a move made by the 
abovementioned Ahmad Ramadan, in June 2012, when in the name 
of the SNC, he founded the Revolutionaries’ Front of Syria (which 
seems to have been an attempt by the Aleppo faction to have a more 
prominent role to counterbalance the Hama faction), which was de-
fined as a body incorporating the armed factions working all over 
Syria against the dictatorship. Although it has established its own 
councils it seems to have had a short-lived existence responding to a 
specific aim whose characteristics never became clear. 
Taking into consideration what has been described above, it seems 
that the Muslim Brotherhood do not have as far-reaching a sphere of 
control as it is usually alleged, especially when analysing the diffi-
culties in forming a unified command. Nevertheless, in December 
2012, a letter was sent by a self-appointed spokesman of the FSA in 
Paris (Fahd al-Masry) to the Muslim Brotherhood accusing them of 
trying to hijack the revolution and impose their will, and of being 
responsible for the prolongation of the suffering of the Syrian people 
(March 30, 2013). No official response was issued besides an inter-
view with Riad Shaqfa68 and an article by Omar Mushaweh, editor 
in-chief of Al-Ahd magazine, which does not expressly refer to this 
issue, but to the campaign being waged against the Muslim Brother-
hood69. The fact that no other declarations were made on the part of 
the FSA itself casts many doubts on the FSA’s unanimity in issuing 
this statement, especially taking into consideration that it was issued 
from Paris and not from inside Syria or the neighboring countries70. 
According to Shaqfa, Al-Masry was only “pretending” to be the 
spokesman of the FSA. 
 
1.7 The Regional factor 
One of the main suspicions cast on the Muslim Brotherhood, build-
ing on the examples of Tunisia and most significantly Egypt (whose 
errors they acknowledged even before the coup against Mursi), is the 
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fact that they are working to gain access to power through the sup-
port of their networks, and thanks to the fact that they seem to be the 
most organised group in the opposition (although, in due course and 
because of the prolongation of the crisis, other groups might become 
an important rival such as the Liberal Islamists on one side of the 
spectrum or the Salafists on the other71), to impose a religious-
dominated system of government.  
Furthermore, it is the Egyptian example that has cast important 
doubts on their intentions because, as a matter of fact, after saying 
they would not present any candidates for the presidential election 
and expelling one of their members (Abu-l-Futuh) for doing so inde-
pendently, they presented a candidate who eventually became the 
Egyptian president. The same goes for the creation of a party techni-
cally independent of the Brotherhood, but which seemed to be more 
influenced by the organisation than it should.  
Since the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood has also created a “national 
party”72, an idea which in a conversation with Zuhair Salim73, he said 
they had been working on for a long time, suspicions have increased, 
although the role of the party remains so secondary that those suspi-
cions have been very much reduced. Regarding the presidential elec-
tions, they have not spoken yet about any presidential candidates as it 
is too early, but what can be stated is that they have refrained from 
presenting their own candidates for any important positions such as 
the presidencies of the SNC or the NC, or the Transitional Govern-
ment. In the same line, they have also insisted that they do not want 
to monopolise power74. Moreover, despite the accusations of their 
predominance on the political, humanitarian and arms-provision lev-
els, the escalation of other Islamist groups on the ground has some-
how reduced these accusations and questioned the possibility of a 
reproduction of the Egyptian scenario in the event of a regime fall, 
leaving aside the enormous differences between both cases. 
Although suspicions have not changed much in recent months, the 
Brotherhood has distanced itself from the experience in Egypt and 
has defended democratic procedures instead of emphasizing the posi-
tive aspects of the Eyptian Brotherhood’s short period of rule. Inter-
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esting as it is, the experience of Al-Nahda in Tunisia, whose shared 
values they could emphasize, has been widely neglected in the offi-
cial and individual statements of the Syrian Brotherhood. 
 
Tentative Conclusions 
As any political faction, the Muslim Brotherhood “want to reach 
power”75 and in order to achieve that aim they have set for them-
selves, they are making use of all the means at hand, especially after 
30 years of forced exile, a limited scope of underground activities 
and preaching. In this, they do not differ from other factions within 
the opposition, who during the years of the Assad family dictatorship 
have been politically ostracised. 
Whether they will achieve their aim remains unclear; however, their 
desire to create a religious state can be ruled out despite the accusa-
tions cast on them, as their emphasis on religion is more focused on 
the social than the political level. Moreover, the idea of an “Islamic 
framework” for the future state is not unanimously agreed upon.  
In relation to their political action, they have shown their capability 
to adapt to different contexts despite their territorial divisions, which 
have appeared during the revolution and which continue to influence 
some of their actions and cause contradictions in their statements. 
This capacity to adapt might play in their favour in the future, but for 
it to work, they will need to overcome not only their territorial dis-
putes but also the generational gap that calls for new faces in the or-
ganisation’s leadership, partly solved in the recent November 2014 
elections, whose long-term effects need to be studied in the future. 
As a matter of fact, they have had to address more regularly their 
moderate audience or potential audience so that they do not fall into 
the Salafi camp, especially regarding the sectarian dimension that the 
struggle has adopted as a result of the regime’s policies and the pro-
longation of the crisis.  
Precisely regarding this particular matter, in July 2012, Muhammad 
Riad Shaqfa declared that they were coordinating with Salafis to 
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form a united Islamist trend76. However, by not issuing any state-
ments adopting a firm position against some declarations that affect 
the unity of Syria that they allegedly cherish could be interpreted as a 
subjugation to Salafi postulates or them having chosen to show sup-
portive silence in order to avoid the Salafis becoming their enemies, 
maybe with a view to making a future alliance.  
If this double-faced image persists, it seems that the Brotherhood will 
lose support and might not achieve as many votes as they seemed to 
be prone to achieve in the beginning. Previous experiences in other 
countries and their alleged dominance over the opposition and their 
making use of all means to achieve power, especially outside the 
country, might become too difficult obstacles to surmount. 
Passing from relative passivity to full-fledged opposition is a wide 
gap that needs to be well calculated. To be effective in all fields, a 
clear statement of refusal to extremism and the promotion of new 
younger leaders (although according to many Zuhair Salim is a wide-
ly accepted figure in Syrian society) can provide a boost to their goal 
of “reaching power” (not necessarily meaning a monopoly over it), 
as well as showing their capacity to adapt, especially after the fiasco 
in Egypt and the rise of Salafism. That adaptation, building on their 
networks, could set a new model for Brotherhood governments in 
case they reach power. 
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